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Automatic Stays and Administrative Expenses:
Rights and Remedies Available to Landlords
and Tenants in Bankruptcy Proceedings
JUDGE JOHN M. TYSON*
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of the United States grants Congress and the fed-
eral courts exclusive jurisdiction and power to legislate in and admin-
ister the bankruptcy laws of the United States.' Congress has
exercised its constitutional power on numerous occasions since Ratifi-
cation, and most recently in October 2005, when extensive revisions
contained in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act (the BAPCPA) became effective.2 Several of these amendments
impact and control the landlord-tenant relationship when one of the
* Judge John M. Tyson serves as a Recall Judge on the North Carolina Court of
Appeals and as an Emergency Superior Court Judge. He also served as an elected
Judge on the North Carolina Court of Appeals from 2001 until 2008. Judge Tyson
earned the designation of Board Certified Specialist-Real Property Law-Business,
Commercial, and Industrial Transactions by the North Carolina State Bar in 2001 (re-
certified in 2007), and is the only North Carolina judge so certified. Judge Tyson has
also been teaching law at Campbell University's Norman Adrian Wiggins School of
Law since 1987. Judge Tyson earned a Master of Laws in Judicial Process (LL.M.)
from the University of Virginia School of Law (2004); a Master of Business
Administration (M.B.A.) from Duke University (1988); a Juris Doctor (J.D.) with
honors from Campbell University School of Law (1979-Member of the Charter
Class); and a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) from the University of North Carolina at
Wilmington (1974).
Judge Tyson is a member of both the North Carolina and Virginia State Bars, a
Certified Mediator and Arbitrator, a past member of the North Carolina Property Tax
Commission, and past elected Chairman of both the Cumberland County Joint
Planning Board and the Cumberland Soil and Water Conservation District. Judge
Tyson's more than twenty-nine years of other professional experience includes the
private practice of law and senior level corporate real estate development and counsel
positions with three national corporations. Judge Tyson is a frequent continuing legal
education author and presenter.
Appreciation is expressed to Kimberly N. Callahan, Esq., Christopher S. Morden,
Esq., Elliot D. McDonald, Linsy Wells, S. Thomas Currin II, and Christopher G.B.
Dozier for research assistance and in processing this manuscript.
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
2. For the legislative history of the BAPCPA, as well as a "red-lined" text of the
Bankruptcy Code showing the BAPCPA amendments, see H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1
(2005).
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parties files for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy court orders preempt con-
trary provisions of state law by operation of the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution of the United States.3
This Article will address the following issues: (1) the rights
acquired by and the consequences of a landlord or tenant filing for
bankruptcy; (2) the effect of the automatic stay; (3) lifting the auto-
matic stay and regaining possession by a landlord; (4) rent and admin-
istrative expense payments during the pendency of bankruptcy
proceedings; and (5) the assumption or rejection of the lease.
I. THE AUTOMATIC STAY4
The Bankruptcy Code (the Code) provides a debtor with several
different types of relief. The more common actions are Chapter 7,5
which is a complete liquidation, and Chapters 116 and 13, 7 which are
debt reorganization proceedings.'
Upon the filing of a petition, the bankruptcy estate is established. 9
The estate generally includes "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case," and "[a]ny
interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of
the case." 1° The filing of the petition commences the case and imple-
ments an automatic stay of any collection or other enforcement pro-
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4. For general information and extensive case citations, see those chapters on
bankruptcy contained within Volumes 8A and 8B of Corpus Juris Secundum (primarily
8B CJ.S. Bankruptcy § 908-941 (2006)) and Volumes 9 through 9E of American
Jurisprudence 2d (primarily 9C AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy 88 2326-2387, 2395-2412
(2006)).
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (2006).
6. Id. § 1101-1174.
7. Id. §§ 1301-1330.
8. This Article will not discuss filings under Chapter 9 (municipalities) or
Chapter 12 (family farms).
9. Id. § 541(a).
10. Id. § 541(a)(1), (7). The Code covers and refers to leases under the provisions
applicable to executory contracts. Id. § 365; see Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. Int'l Ladies
Garment Workers' Union, 734 F.2d 1020, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984) ("The Bankruptcy
Code provides that, with some exceptions and subject to court approval, a trustee 'may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.' 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(a). The Code nowhere defines 'executory.' Examination of the Code's
legislative history provides little help. It reveals only that Congress, aware of the
imprecision of the term, intended executory contracts generally to include those 'on
which performance remains due to some extent on both sides."' (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844)).
2
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ceedings against the debtor. 1 The automatic stay preempts and
prohibits creditors from instituting, maintaining, or proceeding with
any action against the debtor, or attempting to collect or enforce judg-
ments or liens against the debtor after the petition is filed.
12
It is the creditor's duty to verify whether a bankruptcy petition has
been filed and whether a stay is in effect.' 3 The creditor, or its coun-
sel, acquires a further obligation to bring the debtor's bankruptcy fil-
ing to the attention of other courts in which litigation is pending, and
to ensure that no further action is taken until the stay is lifted or the
bankruptcy proceeding is completed. 4 The creditor's failure to honor
the automatic stay may result in the creditor being held in contempt.
1 5
If the creditor's disregard of the automatic stay is found to be willful
and knowing, the creditor may be subject to punitive damages.' 6
Even though a debtor has assigned a lease, the automatic stay pro-
tects any retained interest by the debtor. 7 If the debtor is a sub-tenant,
the master lease may be protected by the automatic stay from adverse
action.' 8 Certain property interests of the debtor are not acquired by
11. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
12. Id.
13. See Carter v. Van Buskirk (In re Matter of Carter), 691 F.2d 390, 391-92 (8th
Cir. 1982) ("Our review of the record convinces us that the district court was correct
in concluding Lewis had received actual notice of the bankruptcy court's restraining
order and, as indicated, that rather than disregard that order, Lewis was obligated to
contact the bankruptcy court to ascertain whether the order had in fact been entered
and to obey it." (citing In re MacDonald, 6 B.R. 23 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (holding
that the creditor was notified by debtor's counsel that a bankruptcy filing was
imminent, and thus the creditor should have waited to repossess the automobile until
creditor contacted the bankruptcy court and ascertained whether a bankruptcy
petition had been filed))).
14. See In re Mims, 209 B.R. 746, 748 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) ("A creditor
pursuing a garnishment simply cannot sit back and wait for the debtor to act because
the effect is to continue to deprive the debtor of property in the possession of the
garnishee or the state court in violation of the automatic stay .... The creditor and its
agents, including its attorney, have an affirmative duty to stop the garnishment
proceeding.").
15. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k).
16. Id.
17. See 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rockefeller Ctr., Inc. (In re 48th St. Steakhouse,
Inc.), 61 B.R. 182, 189 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Viewing the debtor's interest in the
premises as that of an equitable owner because of the argued collateral assignment, the
automatic stay was in any event violated when [the creditor] served the notices. This
is so because a debtor's assignment of property for collateral purposes does not divest
the debtor of all interest in the property. Thus, the automatic stay is triggered."
(citations omitted)).
18. See id. at 188 ("In certain unusual circumstances, a third party may gain
protection of the stay as an incidental result of the protection afforded estate property.
41520091
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the bankruptcy estate. Examples include: (1) "any power that the
debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other than the
debtor," and (2) "any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of
nonresidential real property that has terminated at the expiration of
the stated term of such lease before the commencement of the case."' 9
II. LIFTING THE AUTOMATIC STAY AND REGAINING POSSESSION
The bankruptcy estate does not include
any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresidential
real property that has terminated at the expiration of the stated term
of such lease before the commencement of the case under this title, and
ceases to include any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of
nonresidential real property that has terminated at the expiration of
the stated term of such lease during the case[.] 20
Because the bankruptcy estate has no interest in a terminated
lease, the automatic stay does not prevent "any act by a lessor to the
debtor under a lease of nonresidential real property that has termi-
nated by the expiration of the stated term of the lease before the com-
mencement of or during a case under this title to obtain possession of
such property. "21 This exception to the automatic stay only applies to
actual holdover tenants after expiration of the stated lease term and
does not include situations where a debtor's breach of a lease provi-
sion constitutes default and allows for termination of the lease.22 The
automatic stay does not toll the time at which the lease will expire in
accordance with its stated terms.23
In recognizing this, one court aptly stated: 'Where, however, a debtor and a nondebtor
are so bound by statute or contract that the liability of the nondebtor is imputed to the
debtor by operation of law, then the Congressional intent to provide relief to debtors
would be frustrated by permitting indirectly what is expressly prohibited by the
Code.... Clearly the debtor's protection must be extended to enjoin litigation against
others if the result would be binding upon the debtor's estate."' (quoting Plessey
Precision Metals, Inc. v. Metal Ctr., Inc. (In re Metal Ctr., Inc.), 31 B.R. 458, 462
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1983)) (citing Harsh Inv. Corp. v. Bialac (In re Bialac), 712 F.2d 426,
432 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Neither of these interests are within protections afforded by a
literal interpretation of section 362, yet they should be protected by the stay if the
purposes of the Act, the orderly disposition of all property in which the debtor has
some interest, are to be achieved."))).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b).
20. Id. § 541(b)(2).
21. Id. § 362(b)(10).
22. Id. § 362(a).
23. See Consol. Energy Corp. v. O'Brien (In re Matter of Compass Dev., Inc.), 55
B.R. 260, 262 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1985) ("It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that
§ 362(a) was not intended to act as a toll on leases, contracts and the like, but only as a
416 [Vol. 31:413
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The 2005 amendments to the Code allow landlords to evict
defaulted or holdover tenants in other situations: (1) when any judg-
ment or writ of possession is obtained by a landlord prior to the com-
mencement of a bankruptcy petition, that action may be continued
until or enforced after the bankruptcy proceedings are completed, and
(2) a landlord may initiate an eviction proceeding during a bankruptcy
proceeding if the grounds for the eviction are the tenant's use of con-
trolled substances on the property or "endangerment" of the
property.
24
[T]he statutory language ... provides no guidance to [a bankruptcy]
court in making findings about the truth or legal sufficiency of a les-
sor's certification that the debtor has "endangered" the property or
used or "allowed to be used" a "controlled substance" on the property.
These terms and phrases are not defined in the ... Code and are sub-
ject to varying interpretations.25
In addition to those limited situations, the landlord retains other
options. The landlord may move the court to order or approve post-
petition rent payments from the debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(d)(3). If granted, these rental payments are classified as an
administrative expense of the estate and gain priority for payment over
other subordinate claims until the lease is assumed or rejected. 26 The
landlord may also petition the bankruptcy court for relief from the
automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), if the lease expired
after the debtor filed for bankruptcy and the debtor is holding over and
remains in possession. Relief from the automatic stay may be granted
on motion and after notice and hearing under the following
circumstances:
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest
in property of such party in interest;
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection
(a) of this section, if-
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization[.127
stay on actual proceedings and similar acts against the debtor. The Court agrees ...
that a lease is subject to expiration at its stated term, notwithstanding the protection
of the automatic stay.").
24. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22)-(23).
25. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 31 362.05[21], at 84.4 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2008) (footnote omitted).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3).
27. Id. § 362(d).
20091
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Relief from the automatic stay in order to evict a debtor-tenant for
default on an unexpired lease is rare and difficult to obtain. Reposses-
sion of leased premises by a creditor will ordinarily have a significant,
if not catastrophic, effect on a debtor. The reluctance of bankruptcy
courts to grant relief from the stay especially holds true in Chapter 11
proceedings, where the debtor-in-possession needs to retain the prem-
ises, remain open, and continue in business while re-organizing. 28
The better remedy for the creditor-landlord is to move for the pay-
ment of post-petition rent as an administrative expense of the estate
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3). This motion protects the continued
stream of income to the landlord and prevents the debtor-tenant from
becoming a free rider at the expense of other tenants, the landlord, and
the lender.2 9 A motion for allowance of administrative expense is
required, unless otherwise provided by the bankruptcy court by a
standing order or local rule.3 °
The stay remains in effect until any one of the following events
occur: (1) an individual creditor moves for, and receives relief from, the
automatic stay; (2) the property is removed from the bankruptcy
estate; or (3) the case is closed, dismissed, or discharge is granted or
denied.31 A debtor may not waive the automatic stay, either all
together or on a case-by-case basis, through a pre-petition agreement.3 2
Any default provisions contained in the lease allowing the landlord to
regain possession of the premises or terminate the lease as a default
based on the filing of a bankruptcy petition are ineffective. 33
III. ASSUMPTION AND REJECTION OF THE LEASE
A bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession can assume or reject
only an unexpired lease.34 In order to determine whether and when
the lease term expired, the bankruptcy court reviews the status of the
28. See Zagata Fabricators, Inc. v. Superior Air Prods., 893 F.2d 624, 627 (3d Cir.
1990) ("Because bankruptcy proceedings are considered to be equitable, however, the
landlord's right to collect monetary relief is somewhat curtailed .... "); In re Penny, 52
B.R. 816 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3).
30. See Mo. Dep't of Revenue v. L.J. O'Neill Shoe Co. (In re L.J. O'Neill Shoe Co.),
64 F.3d 1146, 1147-48 (8th Cir. 1995).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1)-(2).
32. See Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys., Inc., 790 F.2d 206, 207 (2d Cir. 1986)
("Relief from the effect of the automatic stay provisions of section 362(a)(1) must be
sought from the bankruptcy court pursuant to section 362(d), and not from this
court." (citations omitted)).
33. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e)(1), 541(c).
34. Id. § 365(a); see also id. §§ 362(b)(10), 541(b)(2).
418 [Vol. 31:413
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lease on the day the petition was filed.3 5 State property law generally
determines the status of the parties and whether the lease has expired
or has terminated.36 Even if the lease terminated pre-petition, the
debtor may still retain a residual interest, which will be protected by
the automatic stay.3' The unexpired lease must be assumed or
rejected by the bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession as a
whole.38
A. Tenant Files for Bankruptcy
The Code allows a bankruptcy trustee to recover any "preferential
payments" made to any creditors within the ninety days prior to the
debtor's filing for bankruptcy.39 Payments made "in the ordinary
course of business" are not preferential and are not subject to recap-
ture, even if the debtor-tenant paid within ninety days prior to filing for
bankruptcy.' Rental payments made by the debtor-tenant on or about
35. See In re Matter of Dunes Casino Hotel, 63 B.R. 939, 946 (D.NJ. 1986) ("[A]n
'executory contract or lease validly terminated prior to the institution of bankruptcy
proceedings is not resurrected by the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.' Thus, the
court must examine the status of the contract on the date the petition was filed."
(citation omitted) (quoting Kopelman v. Halvajian (In re Matter of Triangle Labs.,
Inc.), 663 F.2d 463, 467-68 (3d Cir. 1981)) (citing In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224, 230
(Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984))).
36. See In re Matter of Escondido W. Travelodge, 52 B.R. 376, 378 (S.D. Cal. 1985)
("An examination of § 365 reveals that a debtor may not assume a lease once it has
expired. Expiration, in turn, has been defined by the case law to include termination
under state law prior to the filing of a Chapter 11 petition." (citations omitted) (citing
11 U.S.C. § 365; Kearny Mesa Crossroads v. Acorn Invs. (In re Acorn Invs.), 8 B.R.
506, 510 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981); Don Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases
in the Bankruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 341, 346 (1980))).
37. Protected interests may include options to purchase or renew or leasehold
improvements. See City of Valdez, Alaska v. Waterkist Corp. (In re Waterkist Corp.),
775 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Waterkist stands to lose its interest in over one
million dollars in improvements. The City, on the other hand, is subject to a default of
only $27,301.52 on a lease in which the cash payments are secondary to the
improvements to the leased property and the benefits to the local economy which the
City has received. Applying Alaska law, we conclude that Waterkist's interest in the
lease is not forfeited. The bankruptcy court correctly determined that Waterkist could
assume the lease as a debtor-in-possession.").
38. See In re Morande Enters., Inc., 335 B.R. 188, 192 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005)
("The law is clear that an executory contract may not be assumed in part and rejected
in part. If a contract is executory, it may be assumed only in whole and not in part. It
is black letter law that an executory contract must be either assumed in its entirety,
cum onere, or completely rejected." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
40. Id. § 547(c).
20091 419
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the due date are not generally considered a "preferential payment"
because they are made "in the ordinary course of business."41
Preferential claims may be asserted if a tenant makes late pay-
ments, or agrees to pay past due rent in installments, within the ninety
days preceding the debtor's filing for bankruptcy. 42 Those late pay-
ments are no longer made "in the ordinary course of business. '43
Although late rental payments are not per se recoverable by the bank-
ruptcy trustee, the burden of proof rests upon the creditor to establish
the payment was "in the ordinary course of business. '44
1. Residential Leases
In Chapter 7 cases, the Code allows sixty days after the filing of
the petition for the bankruptcy trustee to assume or reject an
unexpired residential lease.45 If neither assumption nor rejection
occur within the sixty day time limitation, the lease is deemed rejected
41. See id. § 547(b)-(c).
42. Id. § 547(c).
43. See In re Matter of Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir.
1993) (stating that a late payment usually will not be in the ordinary course of
business and will therefore be an avoidable preference, but acknowledging that a late
payment can, under limited circumstances, be in the ordinary course of business).
44. In re Matter of Xonics Imaging, Inc., 837 F.2d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 1988); see,
e.g., Armstrong v. Gen. Growth Dev. Corp. (In re Clothes, Inc.), 45 B.R. 419 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1984) (holding payments to be "in the ordinary course of business" where
debtor, though in arrears for prior months, made rent payments for two months prior
to filing, payments were credited to those months, and commercial lessor had a general
policy of accepting current rent payments, while working out prior rental arrearages).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1); see Stoltz v. Brattleboro Hous. Auth. (In re Stoltz), 315
F.3d 80, 85-86 n.1 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Whereas the Bankruptcy Code specifically gives a
Chapter 11 debtor the authority to assume an unexpired lease, there is no
corresponding provision in the code for a chapter 7 debtor. Under Chapter 7, only the
bankruptcy trustee may exercise the option to assume or reject a lease. Stoltz's public
housing lease was deemed rejected by the trustee by operation of law under 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(d)(1). A rejected lease is abandoned and no longer property of the estate.
Rejection, however, is not the same as termination. A rejected lease is treated as if the
debtor breached it immediately prior to the petition date, and the parties are generally
left with the rights and remedies available outside of bankruptcy law." (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Rodall, 165 B.R. 506, 507 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1994)) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 3 65(g), 1107(a); In re Knight, 211 B.R. 747, 748
(Bankr. D. Or. 1997); Blackburn v. Sec. Pac. Credit Corp. (In re Blackburn), 88 B.R.
273 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988); In re Sheard, No. 98-19627DWS, 1999 WL 454260, at *3
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 24, 1999) ("[I1n virtually every Chapter 7 no-asset case the
trustee realizes no benefit from assuming the debtor's residential lease, and thus in
virtually every Chapter 7 no-asset case, the residential lease is deemed rejected
.... IT ).
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and possession by the tenant-debtor ends.46 In cases filed under either
Chapter 11 or 13, the debtor-in-possession may assume or reject an
unexpired residential lease "at any time before the confirmation of a
plan, but the court, on the request of any party to such contract or
lease, may order the trustee to determine within a specified period of
time whether to assume or reject such contract or lease. 47 The bank-
ruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession must secure approval from the
bankruptcy court to assume an unexpired lease.48 If the lease is
assumed, the rent either continues for the same amount previously
reserved or at some amount as agreed to by the landlord and the bank-
ruptcy trustee. The post-petition payments are given priority over
other unsecured creditors as an administrative expense to the bank-
ruptcy estate.49
Once the lease is assumed, the bankruptcy trustee may assign the
lease.5° The bankruptcy trustee may assign the unexpired lease only
if: "(A) the trustee assumes such contract or lease in accordance with
the provisions of [11 U.S.C. § 365]; and (B) adequate assurance of
future performance by the assignee of such contract or lease is pro-
vided, whether or not there has been a default in such contract or
lease.' This assignment can occur even if the lease contains an
express provision prohibiting an assignment or sublease.5 2
46. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1).
47. Id. § 365(d)(2).
48. Id. § 365(a). All that need be done in the sixty day period is for the trustee to
manifest an unequivocal intent to assume the unexpired lease. This manifestation is
frequently made through a motion to assume the unexpired lease; however, the initial
manifestation is not required to be made by motion. The court's approval does not
have to occur within the sixty day period. See In re Delta Paper Co., 74 B.R. 58, 60
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987) ("The filing of the motion to assume by the debtor on March
24, 1987, within the 60-day period, was a sufficient manifestation of the debtor's
intention to assume as to meet the 60-day time requirement set forth in § 365(d)(4).
This court believes a construction requiring the entire assumption process, including
court approval, to occur within 60 days of the commencement of the case, to be
unreasonable and out of step with the congressional intent behind the enactment of
§ 365(d)(4)."). The sixty day period previously proscribed by 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4)
was replaced with a 120 day period in 2005. See In re Matter of Burival, 392 B.R. 793,
796 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2008).
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3).
50. Id. § 365(0.
51. Id. § 365(0(2).
52. Id. § 365(e).
20091
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Generally, only the bankruptcy trustee may permit the assump-
tion of a lease. However, an exception to this rule exists.53 The Code
allows an individual debtor to
(A) ... notify the creditor in writing that the debtor desires to assume
the lease. Upon being so notified, the creditor may, at its option,
notify the debtor that it is willing to have the lease assumed by
the debtor and may condition such assumption on cure of any
outstanding default on terms set by the contract.
(B) If, not later than 30 days after notice is provided under subpara-
graph (A), the debtor notifies the lessor in writing that the lease is
assumed, the liability under the lease will be assumed by the
debtor and not by the estate.
(C) The stay under section 362 and the injunction under section
524(a)(2) shall not be violated by notification of the debtor and
negotiation of cure under this subsection. 54
When the bankruptcy trustee rejects the unexpired lease, it is
deemed to have been rejected immediately prior to filing the petition
for bankruptcy. 55  The landlord retains a pre-petition general
unsecured claim and should file a proof of claim for damages for
breach of the lease. 56 The landlord does not attain the immediate right
to possession, but must wait until the property is "abandoned. 57
[A]bandonment can occur in one of three ways. First, the trustee can
abandon the lease during the pendency of the case by serving a notice
of abandonment, and if necessary, obtaining an order of abandon-
ment. This is a common practice where the value of the lease is incon-
sequential, and poses a risk of future liability to the estate. Second, a
party in interest can seek to compel the trustee to abandon the lease.
Third, the trustee can abandon a lease through inaction, analo-
gous to the "deemed rejection" provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
This form of abandonment depends on whether the debtor has identi-
fied the lease in her schedules. If the lease is scheduled, and the trus-
53. See id. § 365.
54. Id. § 365(p)(2)(A)-(C).
55. Id. § 365(g)(1).
56. Stoltz v. Brattleboro Hous. Auth. (In re Stoltz), 315 F.3d 80, 85-86 n.1 (2d Cir.
2002). Rule 3001 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure sets out the
requirements for filing and documenting the proof of claim.
57. See In re Henderson, 245 B.R. 449, 453-54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("As a rule,
the rejection of a lease gives rise to a pre-petition breach, 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1), but
does not terminate the lease .... Where, as here, the lease is residential in nature, the
general rule applies. Thus, rejection, without more, does not terminate the lease or
immediately divest the estate of its interest in the lease. In this regard, property of the
estate ceases to be property of the estate when it is abandoned . (citation and
footnote omitted)).
[Vol. 31:413
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tee does not administer it, the lease is deemed abandoned to the debtor
when the case is closed. If it is not scheduled, it is not abandoned. In
either case, the court can order a different result.
5 8
The time for filing a proof of claim for rejection damages is nor-
mally set by the bankruptcy court in the order approving the motion to
reject. 59 The Code limits the claim for damages for breach of the lease
to a sum that is the greater of one year's rent or fifteen percent of the
rental due for the remaining term of the lease, not to exceed three
years' rent.
60
The same general rules apply to bankruptcies under Chapters 11
and 13 that involve residential leases, with two exceptions: (1) the
debtor-in-possession has the authority to assume or reject the lease,
and (2) there is no automatic deadline by which the lease must be
assumed or rejected.61 The only requirement is that the assumption or
rejection of the lease be accomplished prior to confirmation of the
plan.62 This flexibility provides the debtor-in-possession the time
needed to determine whether the unexpired lease is beneficial to the
bankruptcy estate.6 3 The landlord may move the bankruptcy court to
establish a deadline for assumption or rejection of the lease and for the
payment of administrative expenses while the debtor-tenant remains in
possession.
6 4
2. Non-Residential Leases
For non-residential leases, the bankruptcy trustee in a Chapter 7
case or debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11 case must assume or
reject the unexpired lease by the earlier of: (1) 120 days65 after the
order for relief is entered, or (2) the time the order confirming a plan is
entered. 66 If the lease is rejected, the debtor "shall immediately surren-
58. Id. at 454 (citations and footnotes omitted).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)-(b).
60. Id. § 502(b)(6); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(0.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2); Stoltz, 315 F.3d at 85-86 n.1.
62. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2).
63. See Data-Link Sys., Inc. v. Whitcomb & Keller Mortgage Co. (In re Matter of
Whitcomb & Keller Mortgage Co.), 715 F.2d 375, 378 n.3 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Since a
debtor is in limbo until confirmation of a plan, it is understandably difficult to commit
itself to assuming or rejecting a contract much before the time for confirmation of a
plan. Thus, the code allows for the debtor to provide for assumption or rejection of the
executory contracts in its plan. This procedure insures that the debtor is not in the
precarious position of having assumed a contract relying on confirmation of a
particular plan, only to find the plan to have been rejected.").
64. See id. at 379.
65. Sixty days pre-BAPCPA. 9C AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2397 (2006).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4)(A).
20091 423
11
Tyson: Automatic Stays and Administrative Expenses: Rights and Remedies
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
CAMPBELL LAW REvIEw [Vol. 31:413
der that nonresidential real property to the lessor. ' 67 The 120 days is a
strict deadline and the lease will be rejected by operation of law if the
lease is not unequivocally assumed within that time period.68
67. Id.; see In re Tubular Techs., LLC, 348 B.R. 699, 713-14 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006)
("Further, the mandate in the Rejection Order, which exactly traces the language of the
bankruptcy statute in requiring the immediate surrender of the Leased Premises, is
also consistent with the general principals of federalism and supremacy of federal
laws. Section 365(d)(4) clearly occupies this area of the law in the context of debtors'
relationships with their landlord, and it requires Debtor, without regard to Debtor's
rights at state law, to surrender the Leased Premise upon the rejection of the Lease.
The result produced by the Rejection Order is constitutional and consistent with the
Supremacy Clause. Many other courts have reached similar conclusions under the
pre-Reform Act version of § 365(d)(4), which also provided for immediate surrender
of nonresidential real property upon rejection of a lease." (citations omitted)).
68. See In re BDM Corp., 71 B.R. 142, 144 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) ("Based on a
reading of section 365 in its entirety, together with the language of Bankruptcy Rules
6006 and 9014, and the analysis of recent authority, this court concludes that the only
method of declaring an intention to assume is by filing a formal motion to assume
within 60 days[, now 120 days,] of the order for relief and that failure to do so will
result in the lease being deemed rejected by operation of law. ").
A debtor may be able to argue waiver or estoppel against the landlord. See In re
Matter of Lew Mark Cleaners Corp., 86 B.R. 331, 335 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("This
court is more inclined to follow Judge Buschman's well-reasoned decision in [In re
T.F.P. Resources], which concluded that since the 60 day termination rule is for the
benefit of lessors, lessors can waive its application. If waiver was not applicable, even
in extreme circumstances, harsh results are conceivable. One could imagine the
inequities if a landlord accepted rental payments from a debtor/lessee for years during
the pendency of a Chapter 11 reorganization, only to pull the rug out from under the
debtor if the market value of the lease appreciated. The landlord would essentially
reap a windfall and would have all the benefits of the bargain with the ability to
terminate the contract at any time. Therefore, waiver should properly be a question of
intent as manifested by the lessor's acts." (citing In re T.F.P. Res., Inc., 56 B.R. 112
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983))); Pier 5 Mgmt. Co. v. Occoquan Riverfront P'ship (In re Pier 5
Mgmt. Co.), 83 B.R. 392, 394 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) ("This Court holds that equitable
considerations retain their validity in determining whether a lease should be deemed
rejected by operation of law under § 365(d)(4). Having promised to provide the
information necessary to resolve the rent dispute, the Court finds the Partnership's
subsequent change of position without notice to Pier 5 operates to estop the
Partnership from asserting the forfeiture of § 365(d)(4). Therefore, this Court holds
that the lease is not deemed rejected and may be assumed by the Chapter 7 Trustee
within 60 days of this ruling." (citations omitted) (citing In re Matter of Haute
Cuisine, Inc., 57 B.R. 200 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986); In re Fosko Mkts., Inc., 74 B.R. 384
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987))).
All that need be done within the sixty day period is the unequivocal expression of
intent to assume; court action need not be taken within the time frame. See In re Delta
Paper Co., 74 B.R. 58, 60 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987) ("The filing of the motion to
assume by the debtor .. .within the 60-day period, was a sufficient manifestation of
the debtor's intention to assume as to meet the 60-day[, now 120-day,] time
12
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It is common in large-scale Chapter 11 cases for the deadline to
accept or reject the lease to be extended for many months or even years
into the future. If the bankruptcy court extends the debtor's time
period to assume or reject, the creditor should move for the continued
payment of rent as an administrative expense pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(d)(3). Failure to do so may jeopardize a sale or financing of the
property subject to the lease and place the creditor in default of its loan
covenants.
Most bankruptcy courts prefer for the bankruptcy trustee or
debtor-in-possession to express by written motion the unequivocal
intent to assume the lease.69 The motion can be included in the
debtor-in-possession's bankruptcy plan, so long as it is filed and notice
is given within the 120-day time frame.7 ° If the lease is rejected by
requirement set forth in § 365(d)(4). This court believes a construction requiring the
entire assumption process, including court approval, to occur within 60 days[, now
120 days,] of the commencement of the case, to be unreasonable and out of step with
the congressional intent behind the enactment of § 365(d)(4).").
69. See Sea Harvest Corp. v. Riviera Land Co., 868 F.2d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 1989)
("Bankruptcy Rule 6006(a) provides that a proceeding to assume or reject a lease is
governed by Bankruptcy Rule 9014. Rule 9014 states that relief shall be requested by
motion, with reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing afforded to the opposing
party. A motion must state with particularity the grounds therefore, and.., set forth
the relief or order sought. Rule 9013 also specifies that every written motion (except
those which may be considered ex parte) must be served on the trustee or the debtor
in possession and on any entities specified by the Bankruptcy Rules. Thus, these rules
plainly specify that a debtor in possession must file a formal motion and provide
reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the opposing party." (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
See Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dublin Pub., Inc. (In re Matter of Dublin Pub., Inc.), 81
B.R. 735, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) ("The Court has carefully reviewed the case law
on the issue of whether a debtor can assume an unexpired lease of nonresidential real
property by its conduct and has found that the overwhelming majority of cases hold
that a debtor must file a formal written motion within the 60-day period."); see also
Vilas & Sommer Inc. v. Mahony (In re Matter of Steelship Corp.), 576 F.2d 128, 132
(8th Cir. 1978) ("While section 70(b) requires the trustee to file a sworn statement
showing which of the bankrupt's contracts have been rejected, no such requirement is
imposed for an assumption of an executory contract. An assumption may be shown
by word or by deed consistent with the conclusion that the trustee intended to
assume." (citations omitted)).
70. See Riddle v. Aneiro (In re Aneiro), 72 B.R. 424, 428 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987)
("[The] [liessor ... received notice of th[e] plan's filing on March 12, 1985, 29 days
after the debtor's petition was filed. [The] [d]ebtor's motion to assume the lease was
'made' when served on [the lessor]. The liberal policies underlying Chapter 13 relief
do not require a separate, formal motion to assume a lease where the debtor
communicates an intent to assume pursuant to § 1322(b)(7) under the terms of a plan
filed within the § 365(d)(4) time period.").
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operation of law, the landlord is not required to take any further action
to have the lease rejected, and the debtor must surrender the prop-
erty. 7 1 A split of authority exists among bankruptcy courts regarding
whether the landlord must seek relief from the automatic stay before
ejecting the debtor.7 2
B. Landlord Files for Bankruptcy73
The Code's provision allowing the debtor to assume or reject any
unexpired lease applies equally to a bankrupt landlord.74 On its face,
11 U.S.C. § 365 would appear to subject a tenant to undue hardship
71. See In re S. Motel Assocs., Ltd., 81 B.R. 112, 119 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987)
("Because SMA did not comply with the provisions of § 365(d)(4), the Court finds that
the subject leases terminated as a matter of law sixty days after the order for relief in
this case. No court order is necessary for the rejection to occur; the rejection occurs
automatically and the rejection terminated the leases." (citation omitted) (citing
Ridgeview Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Hurst Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. (In re Hurst Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc.), 70 B.R. 815 (Bankr. Ohio 1987))); see also In re BDM Corp., 71 B.R. at
145.
72. Compare In re Boston Bus. Machs., 87 B.R. 867, 871 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988)
("[A] landlord must obtain relief from the automatic stay before seeking to dispossess
a tenant irrespective of the debtor-tenant's failure to assume, and hence its implicit
rejection of, a lease under § 365(d)(4). We continue to believe that the language of
§ 365(d)(4) requiring a debtor to 'immediate[ly] surrender' an unassumed leasehold
should not be read in such a fashion as to permit a landlord to oust a debtor-tenant
without recourse to state-law procedures for conducting an eviction which would
otherwise be in place." (citations omitted)), In re Dial-A-Tire, Inc., 78 B.R. 13, 16
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1987), In re Re-Trac Corp., 59 B.R. 251, 259 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986),
and In re Mead, 28 B.R. 1000, 1001-02 & n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1983), with In re Criadores De
Yabucoa, Inc., 75 B.R. 96, 96-97 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1987) (allowing dispossession of
tenant-debtor from the leased premises without an accompanying attempt by landlord
to be relieved from the automatic stay).
See In re Damianopoulos, 93 B.R. 3, 6 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The automatic
stay is triggered by the filing of a bankruptcy petition and continues until certain
property is no longer property of the estate and the earlier occurrence of the closing or
dismissal of the case or the denial or granting of a discharge. Subject to certain
exceptions, the stay operates to protect the debtor or the property of the estate from
almost any type of formal or informal action. Thus, if the Court concludes that the
Debtor has no possessory interest in the Cafe lease or that said lease is not property of
the estate, the automatic stay does not affect it. This would be true regardless of
whether the lease terminated pre or post-petition and would effectively render HRR's
motion moot." (citations omitted)); see also Town of Islip v. Ne. Int'l Airways, Inc. (In
re Ne. Int'l Airways, Inc.), 56 B.R. 247, 249 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Bregman v. Meehan (In re
Meehan), 59 B.R. 380, 382-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
73. The statutes and case law do not appear to differentiate between residential
and nonresidential leases, other than the time period within which the lease must be
assumed or rejected.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006).
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when its landlord files for bankruptcy. However, the Code provides
the tenant with a remedy under 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1):
(A) If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under
which the debtor is the lessor and-
(i) if the rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as
would entitle the lessee to treat such lease as terminated by
virtue of its terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or any
agreement made by the lessee, then the lessee under such
lease may treat such lease as terminated by the rejection; or
(ii) if the term of such lease has commenced, the lessee may
retain its rights under such lease (including rights such as
those relating to the amount and timing of payment of rent
and other amounts payable by the lessee and any right of
use, possession, quiet enjoyment, subletting, assignment, or
hypothecation) that are in or appurtenant to the real prop-
erty for the balance of the term of such lease and for any
renewal or extension of such rights to the extent that such
rights are enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
(B) If the lessee retains its rights under subparagraph (A)(ii), the
lessee may offset against the rent reserved under such lease for
the balance of the term after the date of the rejection of such lease
and for the term of any renewal or extension of such lease, the
value of any damage caused by the nonperformance after the date
of such rejection, of any obligation of the debtor under such
lease, but the lessee shall not have any other right against the
estate or the debtor on account of any damage occurring after
such date caused by such nonperformance. 75
This provision provides the solvent tenant of a bankrupt landlord
with two options: (1) treat the rejection as a termination of the lease,
quit the premises, and file a claim for damages against the bankruptcy
estate, or (2) remain on the premises and continue to pay rent, with-
holding whatever amount is necessary to "self-compensate" for dam-
ages incurred in performance of obligations that were originally
assigned to or assumed by the landlord under the lease. 76 If the sol-
vent tenant chooses to remain on the premises and perform those obli-
gations, further rent payments may be completely offset by the costs of
performance of the landlord's lease obligations. If the tenant's dam-
75. Id. § 365(h)(1)(A)-(B).
76. Id.; see also Milstead v. Tele Media Broad., Inc. (In re Milstead), 197 B.R. 33, 35-
36 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) ("Under § 365(g)(1), rejection of an unexpired lease by a
debtor constitutes a breach of that lease prepetition. Accordingly, the non-debtor party
to the lease becomes the holder of an unsecured prepetition claim.").
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ages exceed the amount that is withheld in rent, those additional dam-
ages are not recoverable.77
A significant risk that a tenant could be dispossessed may arise if
a solvent tenant rests on its 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) laurels, without also
paying attention to 11 U.S.C. § 363(f), which states:
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this sec-
tion free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other
than the estate, only if-
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free
and clear of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to
be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such
property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceed-
ing, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.78
The use of the coordinating disjunctive "or" shows congressional
intent that the existence of and compliance with either of these condi-
tions is sufficient to validate the sale.79
This precise situation arose in Precision Industries, Inc. v. Qual-
itech Steel SBQ, LLC (In re Qualitech Steel Corp.).8 ° Precision, as tenant,
entered into a land lease agreement with Qualitech, wherein Qualitech
granted Precision exclusive possession of the land for a ten year
period.8 1 Qualitech filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection one
year after the lease had commenced. 82 After notice to all creditors and
parties in interest, Qualitech sold all of its assets "free and clear of all
liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests. 8 3 The purchaser of the
property asserted it was not bound by Precision's lease.8 4 The bank-
ruptcy court agreed, but the district court disagreed and held the pur-
chaser was bound by the lease.8 5
77. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(B); Milstead, 197 B.R. at 36 ("Under § 365(h)(2), a
debtor lessor remains liable for any damages caused by the nonperformance of any
obligation of the debtor under the lease, but the lessee's damages are limited to an
offset of the rent due under the lease.").
78. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
79. Id.
80. 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003).
81. Id. at 540.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 541.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 542.
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The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. The issue presented before the court was whether
"the terms of [11 U.S.C. § 365(h)] conflict with and override those of
[11 U.S.C. § 363(f)]. ' 6 The court of appeals reversed the district
court's ruling and held that Qualitech's selling of its assets under 11
U.S.C. § 363(f) completely extinguished any right or interest that Pre-
cision, as tenant, possessed in the land under its lease.8 7 The court of
appeals based its decision on Precision's failure to object, after it had
notice, to the proposed sale of the underlying property.88 If Precision had
timely objected to the proposed sale by the debtor under 11 U.S.C.
§ 363, the bankruptcy court would have been required to take steps to
protect Precision's leasehold rights.8 9
The court of appeals stated that the provisions of 11 U.S.C.
§§ 363(f) and 365(h) can be harmonized and are not in conflict:
[I]t is apparent that the two statutory provisions can be construed in a
way that does not disable section 363(f) vis A vis leasehold interests.
Where estate property under lease is to be sold, section 363 permits
the sale to occur free and clear of a lessee's possessory interest-pro-
vided that the lessee (upon request) is granted adequate protection for
its interest. Where the property is not sold, and the debtor remains in
possession thereof but chooses to reject the lease, section 365(h)
comes into play and the lessee retains the right to possess the property.
So understood, both provisions may be given full effect without com-
ing into conflict with one another and without disregarding the rights
of lessees. 90
Where a solvent tenant is facing a bankrupt landlord, the tenant
must be ever vigilant to protect its possessory rights. 9' Otherwise, and
particularly in the case of a land lease of unimproved property, a
debtor-tenant could lose not only possession, but also the use and
value of all leasehold improvements it made on the property. In many
86. Id. at 546.
87. Id. at 546-48.
88. Id. at 548.
89. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(e)-(f) (2006).
90. Precision, 327 F.3d at 548.
91. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (2007) ("All . . . contracts for leasing lands
exceeding in duration three years from the making thereof, shall be void unless.., put
in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith ...."); id. § 47-18 ("No...
lease of land for more than three years shall be valid to pass any property interest ...
but from the time of registration thereof in the county where the land lies ...."); John
M. Tyson, Drafting, Interpreting, and Enforcing Commercial and Shopping Center Leases,
14 CAMPBELL L. REv. 275, 277 (1992) ("[The Conner Act, North Carolina's recordation
statute,] has been interpreted to require the party asserting a superior right to be a
bona fide purchaser for value.").
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cases, the lost value of the leasehold improvements may far exceed the
value of the underlying property.
SUMMARY
Exercising simple caution in pending bankruptcy proceedings will
prevent major headaches for the solvent landlord or tenant when the
other files for bankruptcy. Know the Code's limitations and seek
counsel from a knowledgeable bankruptcy attorney. When in doubt,
presume the automatic stay applies and affects a creditor's ability to
enforce its lease. Not proceeding with enforcement actions after the
automatic stay becomes effective may keep a creditor from raising the
ire of a bankruptcy judge and from having to pay compensatory and,
possibly, punitive damages to the debtor. Note the deadline for the
debtor-in-possession or trustee to assume or reject an unexpired lease,
and ensure that the bankrupt tenant is not unintentionally dispos-
sessed by operation of law.
To preserve cash flow a landlord should immediately seek pay-
ment of post-petition rent through a motion for payment of administra-
tive expenses pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3). A solvent tenant
must preserve the value and continued use of leasehold improvements
and ensure that a sale pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 does not "slip
through" to deprive the tenant of their 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) options to
protect and enforce the terms of the lease.
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